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Abstract: 
This study examines the political uses of “conflict diamond” discourse in global debates about 
commodity certification and socially responsible mining in Zimbabwe. Engaging critical literature 
on “conflict-free” corporate branding initiatives, the study focuses on representations of conflict 
in Marange, in Zimbabwe’s eastern highlands. In 2006, a diamond rush in Marange drew in tens 
of thousands of artisanal miners from across Zimbabwe as well as foreigners, and the government 
initiated military crackdowns in 2008. In a highly contested vote in 2009, the international 
government delegates who comprised the voting members in the Kimberley Process Certification 
System (KPCS) ruled that conflict in Marange did not meet the KPCS definitions of “conflict 
diamond.” The study examines discourses of key stakeholders in the multinational diamond 
industry, human rights organizations, policymakers as well as artisanal miners in Zimbabwe 
between 2006 and 2014. The article argues that advocacies against diamond certification as well 
as advocacies favouring certification both tended to overlook the interests of artisanal miners, 
focusing narrowly on certain forms of conflict while associating artisanal mining with illicitness. 
The Marange case illustrates how conventional discourses on “conflict diamonds” not only 
obscure the complex nature of conflicts in contemporary capitalist accumulation processes; they 
also risk contributing to new forms of structural violence. This analysis highlights the need to pay 
careful attention to how global commodity certification discourses inter-relate with political 
agendas at multiple scales. The study draws attention to dilemmas for geographers when 
portraying the interests of marginalized groups in – and affected by – the diamond mining sector. 
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Highlights 
- The case of Zimbabwe challenges the diamond industry’s global certification scheme 
- Both sides of a global debate about Marange’s diamonds simplified “local” concerns 
- Narrow technical focus on “conflict commodities” obscured artisanal miners’ rights 
- Certifying Marange’s diamonds revealed fragmented geopolitical and national interests 
- Critical geography should analyze commodity certification tools as political instruments of 
contested capitalism 
 
 
 
 “We want to go back. Our families have lived there many years. Why can’t we have the right 
to diamonds too? We should be allowed to go back to Marange.” 
- Artisanal miner, Harare, May 16, 2009 
 
1. Introduction 
In the 1990s, violence in Sierra Leone and Angola led to a proliferation of literature on 
diamond mining and reasons for strict governance of global capitalist commodity chains. 
Recognizing that civil wars had been linked with diamonds traded by rebel forces, with 
diamond revenues used to carry out atrocities, the term “conflict diamonds” was coined late in 
the 1990s and popularized in the 2000s (Falls, 2011). In order to prevent boycotts and retain 
confidence in globally traded diamonds, the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) 
was established in 2002 by the United Nations General Assembly with support from the 
multinational diamond mining industry, governments and non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) as a global system to ensure that diamond trade would not be threatened by association 
with conflict (Grant, 2011; Smillie, 2010). The KPCS has since frequently been celebrated as a 
major breakthrough in socially responsible mining and an “innovation in global governance and 
conflict prevention” (Haufler, 2010, p. 403). In recent years, however, a growing body of 
geographical literature has called into question the political and ethical foundations for 
branding commodities as “fair trade” or “conflict-free” (Schlosser, 2013; Goodman, 2004; 
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Schroeder, 2010). Recent literature on diamond mining in Africa argues that mainstream 
policies for promoting global commodity certification have reinforced and re-entrenched 
existing power inequalities, privileging multinational corporations rather than providing an 
avenue for promoting social justice (Le Billon, 2012; Zulu and Wilson, 2009). 
This article carries forward this debate by examining the politics of certification in 
Zimbabwe after alluvial diamond deposits were discovered in 2006 in Marange District, in 
Zimbabwe’s eastern highlands. Marange’s diamond rush represented a major new development 
for the global diamond industry as well for government officials in Zimbabwe. Compared with 
gold and other precious resources such as platinum, diamonds had not previously been a 
significant feature of Zimbabwe’s economic development, albeit with one prominent exception: 
it had been widely observed that interest in looting diamonds abroad led to Zimbabwe’s  
controversial involvement in the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (Ness, 2001; 
Tamm, 2002). The diamond find by Marange’s villagers began to write a new chapter in 
Zimbabwe’s resource extraction history, with the scramble for diamonds involving tens of 
thousands of people from across Zimbabwe and neighbouring countries. This scramble quickly 
led to competing visions of what a legitimate capitalist commodity chain could look like and 
how alluvial diamonds sitting near the earth’s surface – those that are easily extracted without 
mechanized equipment – could be politicized.  
Within weeks of the start of Marange’s diamond rush, spokespeople from the World 
Diamond Council, a consortium representing the major diamond mining companies and 
retailors globally, portrayed Marange as a chaotic local space in need of stricter surveillance 
and control, criticizing smuggling as a rampant problem (Onstad, 2007). In February 2007, a 
report from Global Witness and Amnesty International warned that illegal diamond trafficking 
from Zimbabwe threatened the good image of U.S. diamond retailers (Amnesty International 
and Global Witness, 2007). Concerns about illegality led to multiple interventions by 
international diamond certification experts between 2007 and 2010, with representatives from 
the KPCS issuing a series of recommendations that sought to bolster the power of the state to 
stop illegal diamond mining and illegal trade (Chikane, 2010). In 2009, following military 
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shootings in Marange, global policymakers debated whether diamonds mined in Zimbabwe 
should be certified by the KPCS and allowed to be traded in the international market. In a split 
decision, voting members of the KPCS – comprised of government delegates from countries 
around the world – ruled that Zimbabwe’s diamonds could be legitimately traded (Chikane, 
2010). 
While recent literature emphasizes the importance of Marange’s diamonds to military 
officials (Towriss, 2013) and the ruling party, the Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic 
Front (ZANU-PF) (Kriger, 2012), critical scrutiny has yet to be given to the discourses of the 
global mining industry, human rights organisations and government agents themselves when 
unpacking the global conflict in Marange, and even less attention has been given to the 
responses of artisanal miners. The case of Marange, while idiosyncratic given the severity of 
Zimbabwe’s economic and political crisis in recent years (Hammar et al., 2010), provides a 
dramatic example of how global capitalist processes can interact with local political 
circumstances to create new political struggles, where “the messy complexity of development 
and contested capitalism” (Plumridge Bedi and Thieme, 2013) merits scrutiny. The present 
article focuses on how discourses of conflict diamonds in Marange exposed fragmented 
priorities nationally - including within the ruling party, ZANU-PF, itself - as well as globally, 
showing multiple scales of interests inter-relating during the processes of securing a commodity 
chain worth billions of dollars. The article draws on the author’s doctoral research covering a 
seven year period of mining sector politics in Zimbabwe between 2006 and 2013, including 
document reviews and interviews with key stakeholders in the multinational diamond industry 
(including representatives of two companies with previous claims to Marange’s diamond 
exploration rights – De Beers and Africa Consolidated Resources [ACR]), human rights 
organizations (including representatives of NGOs based in Europe, North America, South 
Africa and Zimbabwe), government officials (including authorities in the Ministry of Mines 
and the Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation [ZMDC]) as well as over 150 artisanal 
miners from diverse socioeconomic backgrounds (Spiegel, 2013). Artisanal miners who had 
lived in Marange as well as miners from other regions of Zimbabwe were interviewed prior to 
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and after the KPCS’s decision to certify Zimbabwe’s diamonds. As the Marange diamond fields 
were not accessible due to heavy military presence in the region, interviews were conducted in 
Harare, Bulawayo and in the Kadoma, Insiza and Mazowe regions where the author 
interviewed temporary diamond panners who had gone to Marange. 
There is a growing literature on the need for understanding perspectives of stakeholders 
along multiple points in commodity value chains, with a view towards conceptualizing equity-
sensitive interventions (Butler et al., 2013). In understanding certification schemes, geographers 
increasingly emphasize how power imbalances at multiple scales lead to a complex “collision 
of discourses” (Baird and Quastel, 2011, p. 347). Hirons (2011) specifically noted the need for 
discourse analysis related to artisanal mining, in line with the post-structural view that posits 
discourse as an “inescapable institutionalization of power relations” (Hirons, 2011, p. 348). The 
approach taken in this study emphasizes that the Marange case is politically significant both 
due to global economic interests in protecting the affective image of a commodity that draws its 
value as a symbol of love (Falls, 2011) as well as due to the regional economic interests at 
stake. The article argues that the global diamond certification process that was pursued in 
Zimbabwe promoted a discourse of securitization that obscured the conceptual distinction 
between spaces of regulation, where norms for promoting legitimate mining could be 
distinguished and enforced, and spaces of dispossession, where certain classes of small-scale 
producers could be systematically excluded. Diamond fields became spaces where illegality 
was used as a justification for bringing in police and military to remove people from the land in 
order to set up the so-called “right way” (Bone, 2010) to mine diamonds – namely, extraction 
by larger companies. The study focuses on how the language of “conflict diamonds” served 
strategic interests among elite actors within Zimbabwe as well as internationally in the 2006-
2013 period, contributing to an exclusionary form of capitalism that marginalized artisanal 
miners. In this regard, the analysis is situated within the growing calls for examining discourses 
by corporate actors and political elites that legitimize prevailing capitalist practices (Dolan and 
Rajak, 2011; Welker, 2009). 
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Section 2 provides political and economic context for understanding the Marange 
conflict, providing a brief overview of conflicts of interest and violence in managing the 
newfound diamond wealth. Section 3 analyses the spatial politics conveyed by the global 
diamond industry’s technical definitions of “conflict diamonds,” exploring how the Marange 
case study adds to recent critiques of “violence implicit in regulatory interventions in resource 
governance” (Le Billon, 2012, p. 123). Examining political maneuverings at national and 
international scales, the analysis explores how and why prominent debates about the KPCS’s 
technical roles eclipsed the advocacies of artisanal miners regarding access to Marange. Section 
4 considers the implications of geopolitically contested commodity certification discourses and 
concludes by returning to the question of what features of diamond sector conflict drive global 
attention, rethinking implications for geographers. 
 
2. Contextualising Marange’s Diamond Conflicts in a Shifting Terrain of National Crisis 
Since 2000, Zimbabwe’s economic and political instability has been the subject of 
much debate, with scholars stressing the need for nuanced attention to how economic crisis has 
created both winners and losers (Bond and Sharife, 2012; Rutherford, 2012; McGregor, 2008; 
Saunders, 2007; Saunders, 2011). The post-2000 crisis built upon an already worsening 
economy, as the early 1990’s saw Zimbabwe suffering under its disastrous Economic Structural 
Adjustment Program (ESAP), promoted by the World Bank and embraced by President Robert 
Mugabe’s government. Sachikonye (2012) argues that over the 2005-2009 period, Zimbabwe’s 
government increasingly moved from what previously looked like a “development state” to a 
“predatory state.” With hyperinflation rising above 1 million percent during the period of the 
diamond rush between 2006 and 2008, Jones calls this hyperinflationary economy the “kukiya-
kiya economy” – meaning an economy of “making do” in chi-Shona (Jones, 2010, p. 285). This 
economic decline deepened reliance on artisanal mining – the extraction of minerals using 
rudimentary practices – as a survival strategy (Kamete, 2008; Mabhena, 2012). In the early 
2000s, estimates suggested that artisanal mining in Zimbabwe directly involved at least 500,000 
people, supporting the livelihoods of two million people - primarily in the gold sector (Shoko 
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and Veiga, 2004). At the same time, as Chifamba (2003) observed, the liberalized structure of 
Zimbabwe’s mining industry ever since the ESAP period manifested in an oligopolistic mining 
industry (Chifamba, 2003) that favoured elite (black and white) ownership regimes. Dreschler 
(2001) similarly noted that the country’s mineral industry had long been dominated by large 
mining companies in ways that precluded mineral ownership by Zimbabweans local artisanal 
miners. 
Marange’s diamond rush emerged midyear in 2006, when news began to spread of a 
major discovery of alluvial diamonds; within the first few weeks of Marange’s “good news” the 
diamond fields turned into what reporters dubbed “the largest diamond rush in Africa in the last 
100 years” (Thornycroft, 2006). As one artisanal miner recalled, the diamond rush drew huge 
numbers of people from provinces and countries near and far, noting: “More than thousands 
went to Marange…The trains were fully booked.”1 He added: “more than 500 people made 
[mining license] applications for the Marange diamonds.” According to interviews with 
members of the Zimbabwe Miners Federation (ZMF), an organization representing artisanal 
and small scale miners across the country, the diamond scramble in Marange involved local 
villagers, government agents and diverse groups from other areas of the country and other 
countries; those rushing for diamonds included Lebanese, South African, Congolese and Indian 
“fortune-seekers” as well as people from all across Zimbabwe, with different types of groups of 
people involved in diverse mining and trade arrangements (Nyota and Sibanda, 2012; 
Nyamunda and Mukwambo, 2012). 
Legal exploration rights for the Marange diamond fields had been held by De Beers 
throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, only to be relinquished in 2006 to African Consolidated 
Resources (ACR), a multi-national company based in Britain with Zimbabwean partners. The 
renewal of the ACR license was contested by senior government officials, and the Minerals 
Marketing Corporation of Zimbabwe (MMCZ), the sole state buyer and marketer of diamonds, 
was instead granted mining rights for Marange’s diamonds. In the wake of this take-over, in 
                                                 
1 Interview with member of the Zimbabwe Miners Federation at a small-scale gold mining site near Batani 
village, Mazowe, December 4, 2012. 
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October of 2007, only months after its expulsion from the mine, ACR reported that it had 
“suffered losses of at least US$1 billion through the illegal extraction of diamonds by artisanal 
and small-scale miners from its claims in Marange” (Financial Gazette, 2007) in addition to an 
estimated US$2 million worth of diamonds seized during a raid by police on its Harare offices. 
ACR claimed the government’s decision to overturn its ownership claims was illegal and that 
MMCZ had no right to the claims because the Precious Stones Trade Act prohibits any licensed 
dealers like MMCZ from engaging in mining activities, let alone the sole legal buyer (Muleya, 
2007). 
In this account, “conflict” relates to a “conflict of interest” – not “physical conflict” per 
se – and touches on a broader question of who has the right to mine. This ownership issue, 
which continues to be debated in judicial courts (at the end of the study period in 2013), was 
widely portrayed as a friction between ACR and the government. Media reports regularly 
portrayed the ownership debate as a reflection of corporation-versus-government politics that 
showcased ZANU-PF’s contempt for foreign companies (Zimbabwe Independent, 2007). The 
narrative of this kind of friction was given further validity, it may seem, as soon as government 
leaders asserted their power by proceeding to mine the diamonds despite a judicial ruling in 
ACR’s favour. However, focusing narrowly on this sense of friction obscures the numerous 
public protests of different groups of constituents - including artisanal miners - who were also 
heavily marginalized by government plans for diamond sector management.  
 As Marange’s controversy began to emerge during the 2006 Rural District Council 
elections, a report published by international elections observers noted that “local residents [in 
Marange] were allowed to invade diamond claims owned by the British-listed company Africa 
Consolidated Resources.” It continued: “the Minister of Mines Amos Midzi even 
addressed…the illegal miners and allowed them to go ahead with their activities” (Zimbabwe 
Election Support Network, 2006). This sense of being “allowed” to access the diamond fields 
was short-lived.  As government reports emphasized that illegal trading and smuggling was 
among the most significant economic problems in the country (RBZ, 2007), coercive policing 
was presented as a necessary measure to secure revenue for the state.  In the period following 
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November 2006, government concerns about smuggling began to intensify and strategies of 
control by political elites had numerous surveillance dimensions; an Israeli secret service team 
was hired by the government to root out illegal miners in 2006 and police squads were formed 
to take control of Marange. Specifically, a crackdown called Operation Chikorokoza Chapera 
(“No Illegal Mining”) was established to control artisanal mining – in Marange and 
surrounding areas (Hansard, 2007). In November 2008, a crackdown with a harsher title was 
given to the diamond operation, “Operation Hakudzokwi” (meaning “Operation No Return”), in 
which police squads were replaced by military squads. Operation Hakudzokwi targeted areas 
where diamond mining occurred and where smuggling routes were believed to be taking place 
on the road to Mutare and the Zimbabwe-Mozambique border. Reports indicated that 
approximately 9,000 miners were arrested in Marange. As part of this November 2008 
crackdown, in reacting to a call by the World Diamond Council to control smuggling, the Air 
Force of Zimbabwe was deployed, after some police officers refused orders to shoot illegal 
miners, resulting in deploying military helicopter gunships and the shooting of hundreds of 
illegal miners (Partnership Africa Canada, 2010). According to small-scale miners interviewed 
in this study and as also reported by others (Partnership Africa Canada, 2010), there were 
hundreds of deaths from police and military shootings as well destruction of village settlements 
The death toll at first - by mid-December - ranged from 83 (as estimated by the Mutare 
City Council) to 140 (as estimated by the opposition party, the Movement for Democratic 
Change [MDC]) (Dixon, 2008; SW Radio, 2008). Media stories thereafter suggested that at 
least 200 illegal miners were killed.2 A cartoon in the Mail and Guardian (2009) showing an 
image of helicopter shooting and surveillance epitomizes much of the literature on the dark 
sides of the “shadow state” in Africa and its associated violence and corruption – and suggests 
that mining activities were under the watchful eye of military monitors, what Chabal and Daloz 
(1999) call “political instrumentalization of disorder” (p. xviii). While the helicopter shooting 
                                                 
2 Interviews in December 2012 with two miners (one, a gold digger in Mazowe and the other, a riverbed gold 
panner in Nyanga and Mutoko) who had been in Marange during the shooting, suggested that burial grounds 
from this incident have yet to be discovered.   
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debacle also brought renewed global focus on profiteering and greed at the highest levels, 
global focus on corruption was superimposed upon an already-existing national tension over the 
millions of dollars believed to be benefiting elite groups. However, as political shifts emerged 
in 2009 after the formation of the Government of National Unity, with power shared between 
ZANU-PF and MDC, both political parties began voicing to the international community that 
Zimbabwe’s diamonds were legitimate and that KPCS monitors were over-emphasizing the 
helicopter incident. Speaking publicly about such issues in 2009 became delicate for MDC 
party workers once a unity government was formed, as some MDC politicians were under 
considerable pressure to make the ‘unity government’ work (see Barclay, 2010).  
 
3. The Scalar Politics of Conflict: Raising Questions about Diamond Certification 
While the above section provided a preliminary illustration of the conflicts at issue in 
Marange, these were far from a clear match with the formal definition for “conflict diamonds.” 
The definition given by the KPCS reflected a highly specific geopolitical worldview: “Conflict 
diamonds are diamonds that originate from areas controlled by forces or factions opposed to 
legitimate and internationally recognized governments, and are used to fund military action in 
opposition to those governments” (UN, 2001). Marange’s case can be conceptualized as one 
example among a growing number of documented cases of “conflict” that fail to match this 
definition (Le Billon, 2012). Zulu and Wilson (2009) emphasize that this definition, despite 
being created with Sierra Leone in mind, overlooks contemporary conflicts in Sierra Leone, as 
“state centrism distorts or conceals spatial dimensions of conflict” (p. 1110). Indeed various 
African case studies have demonstrated shortcomings of international diamond 
certificationadvocacies. A study by Taylor and Mokhawa (2003) explain how the advocacy of 
international Kimberley Process regulators in Botswana came into conflict with the San 
Bushmen, a local tribe that was pushed off its land. Their research suggested that international 
“clean and safe” diamond promoters gave little regard for local interests, favouring state-led 
control instead while burnishing foreign corporate powers. With the Marange saga evoking 
similar tensions, the analysis below examines how dominant global narratives of ZANU-PF’s 
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misrule inter-related with narratives of corporate corruption and the politicized role of KPCS as 
an instrument for promoting “sound mining practices,” to the detriment of artisanal miners.  
 
3.1 “Not a Diamonds Problem”  
The dominant perspective advanced by spokespeople representing the multi-national 
diamond industry was that Marange’s controversy was a problem of smuggling in conjunction 
with a problem of national leadership within the Government of Zimbabwe. This was illustrated 
in the Washington Post, where Andrew Bone, the Director of International Relations at De 
Beers, wrote that problems in Marange were a “governance problem not a diamonds problem” 
(Bone, 2010). Mr. Bone’s choice of language promoted the view that diamond mining 
controversies boiled down to Mugabe’s misrule, thereby protecting the global diamond 
industry’s “conflict-free” branding instrument itself. This view, which was common in the 
international news coverage of Marange, unsurprisingly drew a reaction from the government. 
Using the state newspapers as well as interview opportunities in international media, 
government officials in Zimbabwe, in response, decried Western imperialism in how foreign 
diamond industry spokespeople and foreign government officials asserted a regime change 
agenda when speaking of the Marange conflict. 
The dominant “ZANU-PF misrule” framing as exemplified by Andrew Bone’s language 
tapped into a wider geopolitical tension that was unfolding. The legitimacy of the Zimbabwe 
Government was increasingly questioned as the Marange saga developed, particularly 
following the contested elections in 2008 and growing concerns about violence related to the 
elections as well as to diamond revenues (Raftoupolous, 2010; Saunders, 2011). Numerous 
Western governments, including the U.S. Government, attempted to impose new sanctions on 
Zimbabwe in 2008, while government leaders from China, Russia and several African countries 
opposed sanctions (Spiegel and Le Billon, 2009). Geopolitical tensions in the KPCS meetings 
became exceedingly high profile, as emphasized in an interview with a Zimbabwe government 
representative who was a delegate at the KPCS meetings in Israel, where international delegates 
debated whether the Government of Zimbabwe had managed the diamond sector in a manner 
12 
 
that violated the KP. When asked about the reasons for harsh policing and ultimately 
militarisation as mechanisms for governing the diamond fields, he explained the state’s 
coercive management tactics as follows: “The shooting [Marange] was necessary. It is exactly 
what we [the Zimbabwe government] were told to do by the Kimberley Certification Scheme to 
stop the chaos in Marange. We had to formalise the diamond fields and stop the smuggling.”3 
Furthermore, using language that cast the Marange controversy as a geopolitical issue, he 
argued that critics of the government “wanted Zimbabwe to be a weak state” and also that they 
“wanted the government to crack down on the diamond rush.” He argued that critics were more 
concerned with politics than with unlocking the potential power of diamonds to benefit 
Zimbabweans, stating:  “The people from the U.S. State Department come to the KP meetings 
to criticize us, to promote what they call ‘democracy’, to prevent the trade of Zimbabwe 
diamonds and to promote the wealthier countries’ diamond industries…[the interviewee later 
referenced ‘Canadian diamonds’ as an example]…” He then added, “If we cannot trade 
diamonds we cannot properly formalise the diamond fields [in Marange] so it [having 
Zimbabwe’s diamonds cleared as legitimate for export under the KP system] is a must…”4 He 
also noted that, “Zimbabwe has done everything possible to comply with KP standards,”5 using 
language which reflected the view that Marange’s resource regulation challenge needed to be 
seen as the sort of challenge that any government would find if thousands of people rushed for 
diamonds and deprived the state of revenue. 
The Minister of Mines had also noted that the Government of Zimbabwe actually 
invited in a team of foreign experts working with the KP: “We expect the team to visit River 
Ranch, Murowa and Marange so that they can make their assessment. I'd like to dispel the 
notion that the [KP] team has imposed itself on us ... they are here at our invitation” (Karombo, 
2007, p. 1). As foreign KP experts pressed on with investigations in the period between 2007 
and 2010, higher penalties for informal miners were imposed and more arrests were made. 
                                                 
3 Interview with consultant to the Ministry of Mines and Zimbabwe Government Delegate for the Kimberley 
Process Certification Scheme Meetings, February 13, 2013, Harare. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid. 
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ZANU-PF politicians led a charge for introducing automatic 5-year jail penalties for any 
artisanal miner caught in possession of diamonds. In public announcements, government 
spokespeople initially mocked the slowness of the KPCS delegation in doing its work; but 
arguably, they were seeking to give as much focus as possible to this issue, while speeding up 
processes of militarized control. One news article explained how the state leaders suspected 
diamonds were being smuggled and the government was “worried about this”; the headline 
read: “Zim diamonds could be financing international terror groups” (Baxter, 2008).  
This framing of the crackdown by the Zimbabwean government as aimed simply at 
complying with KPCS requirements was contested at KP meetings, as described in an interview 
with the Chairperson of the KPCS Review Team for Zimbabwe (for the 2009-2010 period), 
who instead emphasized internal problems of governance in Zimbabwe. While some mining 
company representatives and those with whom they were allied presented the conundrum as 
how to respond to ZANU-PFs misrule, and conversely the Government of Zimbabwe portrayed 
the motivations of Western critics as driven by a desire for regime change, these geopolitical 
tensions were also reflected within the KPCS itself. Indeed, according to the above interviewee, 
KPCS meetings were dominated by tensions between African government officials and U.S. 
government officials, who “were seeing Zimbabwe differently”6, noting that two related but 
distinct types of friction were dominating the discussion. The first of these frictions centered on 
whether the technical definition of “conflict diamonds” should be expanded so as to include 
state-led violence; this could have ramifications for any country (not just Zimbabwe) and 
Zimbabwe was seen as a test case in this regard, with the multinational diamond industry’s 
narrow definition of conflict at stake. The second friction was geopolitical and centred on 
Zimbabwe’s unique place in the Pan-African political landscape; here the debate was 
specifically whether African government leaders who had historically been loyal to President 
                                                 
6 Interview with Chairperson of the KPCS Review Team for Zimbabwe (for the 2009-2010 period), 
September 8, 2009, Maputo, Mozambique (two months before the members of the KPCS voted against 
suspending Zimbabwe). 
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Robert Mugabe would be willing to boycott diamonds from Zimbabwe.7  While the KPCS 
Review Team for Zimbabwe was preoccupied with these questions, a more fundamental 
concern to artisanal miners locally – as expressed by the Zimbabwe Miners Federation 
President – was the role of large-scale mining companies and why artisanal miners were never 
given rights to the diamond fields, as discussed next. 
 
3.2 Discourses of Corruption as Simultaneously “State” and “Corporate” 
As the value of soldiers’ pay collapsed with soaring inflation, it was widely stated that 
diamonds were used to secure the loyalty soldiers as well as enrich party leaders (Human 
Rights Watch, 2010). Prior to the Marange saga, researchers had occasionally praised the 
Zimbabwe Government for promoting legalization of artisanal and small-scale gold mining as a 
means of proactive control, and donors had provided sustainability-oriented funds for 
developing small-scale mining in the 1990s and early 2000s.8 However, amidst the economic 
crisis and politicized context of Marange, as one artisanal miner noted, “…the question of the 
rights of villagers in the area who discovered the diamonds was not taken seriously.”9 When 
politically well-connected companies were given rights to mine Marange diamonds, the 
creation of legalization programmes for artisanal diamond mining was generally regarded as 
“not a realistic idea, given the political circumstances” – to borrow the words of an artisanal 
miner who was interviewed in Harare10 even as some artisanal miners insisted they should be 
able to dig for diamonds. 
In one sense, the discourse of ZANU-PF elites pointed to “illegal” artisanal miners as a 
threat to national economic security, scapegoating miners to deflect from widespread 
allegations of the corruption of ZANU-PF and military officials. However, as noted by an 
                                                 
7 Voting members initially agreed on a “temporary” prohibition on the sale of Zimbabwe’s diamonds until the 
matters were cleared up; this lasted six months. In July, 2010, portions of the Marange diamonds were cleared 
for export. 
8 In 1991, alluvial mining (panning) along the country’s streams was legalized, providing what some believe 
to be one of Africa’s more proactive examples of riverbed alluvial mining regulation (Maponga and Ngorima, 
2003; Spiegel, 2009; Zwane et al., 2006).  
9 Interview with short-term small-scale diamond miner, May 16, 2009, Harare. 
10 Interview with artisanal gold miner, May 15, 2009, Harare. 
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interviewee working in the Ministry of Local Government in Harare, “corruption” in Marange 
was more complex than a problem of “state corruption.” He emphasized that Marange’s 
controversy highlighted a longer-standing friction over access to areas that have been under 
control by larger-scale companies. De Beers had the diamond prospecting rights prior to 2006 
and De Beers, he argued, could not possibly have failed to know the value of the diamond 
fields. He pointed out what had become a common focus point in public discourse by 2007: De 
Beers did not report significant alluvial diamond deposits while it possessed the mining license. 
From his perspective, the only logical explanation for De Beers’ silence on the value of the 
deposit was that De Beers had been looting. Corruption in the 2006-2009 period should, thus, 
he rationalized, be understood in the context of a wider history of corruption, which in turn 
shaped government thinking about managing Marange’s diamond fields.11 In his words, “De 
Beers must have been looting for years. There is no other explanation really…for how the 
biggest diamond deposit in Southern Africa…all of Africa…went un-noticed for so many 
years.”  
This particular concern - about the secret use of licenses and looting by companies -
rightly or wrongly tapped into a wider national concern about foreign companies and the 
government’s incapacity to effectively manage large-scale mining (not just small-scale mining). 
Examination of illicit financial flows is attracting increasing scholarly investigation (e.g. Le 
Billon, 2011), emphasizing not just state corruption but also multi-national companies’ patterns 
of avoiding taxation and royalty payments.12 This argument in the literature suggests that the 
framing of corruption exclusively at a local scale as a demand-side phenomenon rather than a 
more global supply-side pattern may only serve to mask such practices - and is prompting 
attention of African policy makers (Africa Partnership Forum, 2012). An analytic focus on 
corruption in this vein situates Marange in a wider context of state complicity with corporate 
corruption in Zimbabwe – including how in the early 1980s and 1990s a number of mining 
                                                 
11 Interview with senior official in the Ministry of Local Government, May 11, 2009, Harare. 
12 Cross (2011) also insightfully details the attempts of companies such as De Beers to employ an “ethic of 
detachment” to absolve themselves from problems experienced in the processes of diamond production..  
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companies were granted Exclusive Prospecting Orders (EPOs) for diamond prospecting, 
including the Marange area but also other regions. By 2000, approximately 463 diamond EPOs 
were allocated, and as Tsiko (2007) noted, “some companies held over 20,000 claims each for 
over 20 years” (p. 2) and never developed them. Representatives of regional small-scale mining 
associations argued in interviews in 2009 (and in advocacies to the government) that the 
government should revoke the EPOs for multinationals, saying the companies were sitting on 
these vast claims blocking the participation of local companies and others in the exploration of 
precious minerals. Some of the multinationals were accused, by both government leaders and 
small-scale miners alike (albeit with different interests), of utilizing EPOs to benefit financially 
on the global stock exchange without developing the mines. 
While some small-scale miners thought that Marange’s suddenly discovered economic 
value could be attributed to a culture of corporate secrecy, others suggested that nobody could 
have imagined just how valuable Marange was in reality. “There was a rumour that the 
ancestral spirits were hiding the diamonds for us,” was one artisanal miner’s recollection of 
some of the rhetoric he had heard amongst artisanal gold miners as they discussed the secret of 
the value of diamonds in Marange.13 According to some government statements, there seemed 
no doubt that De Beers had been extracting diamonds for years in secret, a claim that Minister 
Mpofu publicly made and that De Beers publicly denied.14 While discourse that blamed De 
Beers reinforced the ZANU-PF strategy of demonizing Western companies in the extractive 
sector, it also was used to justify an elite take-over in Marange. According to government 
policy, any regulated diamond enterprise had to be at least 50% controlled by the government; 
but in practice, by 2012, Chinese and South African companies partnered with political elites in 
Zimbabwe, as stressed in the First Report of the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on 
Diamond Mining (published in June 2013). This Parliamentary Committee issued a stern 
                                                 
13 Interview with short-term small-scale diamond miner, May 16, 2009, Harare. 
14 According to Minister Mpofu, “My records show that they collected more than 100 000 tonnes of diamond 
concentrate and this was mostly alluvial, but they say they still want to find out whether they are diamonds or 
not….Even up to today, I have not got a report about what happened to our samples. In Marange, it doesn’t 
take two minutes to find out that they are diamonds, but it took them 15 years. What hypocrisy!” (Newsday, 
2012). 
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condemnation of the Minister of Mines’ personal handling of the Marange diamonds 
“formalisation” plans, noting that there was a lack of transparency in the company contracting 
process. It also emphasized that 4,300 families were displaced, noting that “many communities 
are being relocated without proper resettlement plans which put communities in danger of 
losing their livelihood system” (Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Mining, 2013, p. 20). 
In sum, the intricate and varied relations between state and corporate actors described 
here highlighted the analytic importance of moving beyond what Plumridge Bedi and Thieme 
(2013) referred to as a false binary of state and market, private and public. While the 
Parliamentary Portfolio Committee focused on internal corruption within the Ministry of 
Mines, it is important to note that the global certification system in itself can also be 
conceptualized as a form of corruption or even legalized institutional violence, as suggested by 
Hines and Snow (2007). To better understand how various international and local civil society 
organizations conceptualized Marange’s saga, we turn to NGO discourses and how these 
evolved. 
 
3.3. Evolving Civil Society Discourses on Marange’s Diamonds 
As critical geographers have observed, advocacies of international diamond-focused 
NGOs like Global Witness (which played a major role in creating the KPCS) have often been 
closely allied to the interests of diamond corporations such as De Beers, working off the global 
standardized assumption that a “clean diamond” can be “objectively” certified through 
commercial audits and monitoring activities by the KPCS (Le Billon, 2012; 2006). The 
Marange conflicts left dilemmas for human rights campaigners at different points in the saga, 
and with different positions taken by various international and local NGOs. During the early 
days of the diamond rush in 2007, most human rights NGO advocacies- both from Southern 
Africa and internationally - suggested that bringing Marange’s unruly diamond trade under 
control was the priority and adding more police was essential. For example, before the military 
shootings of 2008, one report by a South African-based NGO, Southern Africa Resource Watch 
(SARW), wrote: “Control over the diamond fields remains difficult for the 
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authorities…because the police have inadequate human resources” (SARW, 2007). In this 
narrative, the government was being dispossessed of the diamonds and this needed to be 
stopped; the solution would have to be more human and financial resources for law 
enforcement. Supporting this observation, reports widely noted that “the thickly forested fields 
[in Marange] are manned by less than 50 officers, a number too little for the vast fields” (The 
Sunday Mail, 2007). At the same time, the advocacies for more police were complex given that 
local villagers and panners on the one hand, and police on the other, often spoke of engaging in 
“running battles,” a term also used by a police officer working with the Criminal Investigations 
Department during an interview in Bulawayo.15 Stories of being chased and then killed started 
to circulate in mining communities in 2007, although they were scarcely reported in the media 
at the time (in contrast to the period following the helicopter shootings in 2008). Some artisanal 
panners interviewed wondered how NGO advocacies could prioritize tighter police controls 
without adequate government plans in place to promote livelihood activities for local people.  
A now-Harare-based former Marange artisanal diamond panner captured sentiments 
about militarization in 2008, stating: “The diamond panners were targeted with brutality and it 
was merciless….This was a military exercise and the military was vicious… This is Zimbabwe 
you know… Here the diamonds are not for the people but for just the people with guns.”16 
After the military shootings, while “rights” perspectives promoted by international NGOs were 
conditioned by their attention to the KPCS priorities and the international discourse of the need 
to prevent diamond smuggling, rights perspectives took on different meanings. Some human 
rights groups began to re-evaluate their positions and, as the diamonds saga drew on, their 
campaign discourses began to change from stressing the need for more control to attention to 
the physical acts of violence by state security forces. Significantly, in December of 2011, 
Global Witness publicly withdrew its support for the KPCS altogether after the KPCS vote 
allowed Zimbabwe’s diamonds to be certificated on the international market (Eligon, 2011). 
                                                 
15 Interview with official from the Zimbabwe Republic Police - Criminal Investigations Department, April 30, 
2009, Bulawayo. 
16 Interview with former short-term alluvial diamond panner, May 16, 2009, Harare. 
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Yet a notable feature of the discourse of most international human rights NGOs – an example 
being Human Rights Watch – was to play up the threat of brutality as a separate issue, divorced 
from community concerns about resource dispossession, economic distortions or livelihood 
criminalization.  A 21-page report by Human Rights Watch describes the 2006-2010 period as 
being consistently marked by a pattern of “deliberate chaos” by political elites and military 
domination in Marange; its analysis did not address artisanal miners who operated outside of 
military control in the 2006-2007 period, nor did its recommendations address artisanal mining 
at all (Human Rights Watch, 2010).  
Moreover, corruption was often linked inextricably with the identities of marginalized 
artisanal miners, with international NGO and media reports emphasizing the politician-artisanal 
mining liaison as a generally corrupt endeavour. This trend in reportage began early on in the 
saga; for example, as reported in the Mail and Guardian in January 2007, early in the diamond 
rush: “[A]t least three Ministers in Manicaland mobilized villagers to pan for diamonds…The 
diamonds were subsequently sold on the black market bypassing the MMCZ” (Mail and 
Guardian, 2007). Villagers, in other words, were discursively turned into “the mobilized” but 
rarely recognized in international discourse as having resource rights of their own, nor 
portrayed as resistant to police and military control. 
Interviews with members of artisanal mining associations in 2009, 2012 and 2013 led to 
two key findings: first, many of the artisanal miners did resist pressures to collaborate with 
ZANU-PF elites, and secondly, most members of the 7 artisanal mining associations who were 
interviewed felt strongly that they were not supported by international NGOs, let alone by state 
authorities. This was emphasized specifically during a participant observation experience in 
February 2013 at a meeting convened by the Zimbabwe Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining 
Council, where women and men speaking on behalf of artisanal miner associations lamented 
the lack of international support for their rights. As one miner decried, “Our families have lived 
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there [in Marange] many years. Why can’t we have the right to diamonds too?”17 In discussion 
with members of the Zimbabwe Miners Federation, questions emerged about whether 
paradigms for global diamond certification and control help local citizens or hurt rural 
populations. When the author of this study specifically asked artisanal miners in 2009 about 
whether the KPCS should suspend Zimbabwe from the certified diamond market, some 
suggested that it would be wise to refrain from a diamond ban. As one interviewee noted, “it 
isn’t right to boycott us.”18 For others, it mattered little, as smuggling clearly persisted. Others 
puzzled about why the international diamond certifiers would let Zimbabwe “off the hook”; as 
one miner protested to me: “We’re not allowed to mine, but the police are… I don’t understand 
the certification and how it works.”19  
This sense of marginalisation is also echoed by some NGOs in Zimbabwe, which have 
argued that artisanal miners should be taken more seriously. Maguwu (2011), Director of the 
Centre for Research and Development in Harare (one of the more vocal local organisations that 
protested the Marange violence) articulated how displacement of artisanal miners continued to 
take place in the years following the 2008 killings, particularly 
during times when high ranking international and government officials are expected 
to tour the diamond fields…Between March and April 2011, more than four hundred 
artisanal miners were severely assaulted by state security agents ahead of a visit by 
the Africa Diamond Producers Association [which had been invited by the 
Zimbabwean government to witness that mining operations in Marange comply with 
international standards] (Maguwu, 2011 p. 5). 
 
In similar spirit, Claude Kabemba, Director of SARW, lamented the side-lining of 
Africa-based civil society organisations as these processes took hold. He argued: 
African civil society has not found space in the KP to lead the discussion on the 
Marange diamonds. It plays a peripheral role, remaining a passive recipient of 
Western civil society articulations and positions (Kabemba, 2011, p. 20).  
He further argued:  
                                                 
17 Participant observation, Inaugural Meeting of the Zimbabwe Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining Council, 
Jameson Hotel, February 14, 2013. 
18 Interview with short-term small-scale diamond miner, May 16, 2009, Harare. 
19 Interview with short-term small-scale diamond miner, May 16, 2009, Harare. 
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Zimbabwean civil society, together with regional organisations, needs to undertake 
more homegrown advocacy…When Zimbabwean civil society starts to lead the 
debate, I believe that it can produce balanced analysis on the Marange diamonds– 
analysis that factors in Zimbabwe’s political dimension and the geostrategic 
positioning of key world actors that are compounding the difficulty of finding a 
lasting solution (Kabemba, 2011, p. 20). 
Interviews conducted with Kabemba in February 2014 emphasized that not much has changed 
in terms of the limited participation of artisanal miners and NGOs vis-à-vis diamond sector 
governance in Zimbabwe, though he pointed out that some NGOs such as SARW have been 
engaged by Zimbabwe’s Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Mining to train government 
officials responsible for monitoring policy implementation. Notwithstanding the complex 
economic and political interests that connect powerful state actors and diamond mining 
companies, ensuring that diamond mining corporations are more transparent is among the 
training priorities he emphasized. 
 
3.4 Revisiting the Discourse of “Conflict Diamonds” 
The above analysis provides context for understanding political tensions in Marange – a 
region that, by 2013, was deemed to have the largest producing diamond mines in the world in 
term of carats, with an estimated production of 16.9 million carats (Kitco, 2013). Discourses on 
“conflict diamonds” require a critical geographical analysis that pays attention both to the 
global scale of corporate branding and to the historical context in which such discourses have 
developed. While Marange’s diamond mining activities embroiled multiple actors locally, 
nationally and internationally, the global initiatives to thwart “conflict diamonds” throughout 
the 2000s were narrowly premised on efforts to eliminate illegal diamond trafficking, operating 
under the perspective that diamonds can be a “guerrilla’s best friend, providing rebel groups the 
‘loot’ necessary to purchase their weapons and the ‘booty’ rewarding their atrocities” (Le 
Billon, 2006, p. 782). Such representations, and the very definition of “conflict diamonds,” 
presuppose that governments are indeed acting in legitimate ways. The concern that ZANU-PF 
had illegitimately taken control of the government became particularly significantly in 2008 
during an election widely thought to have been actually “won” by the opposition, MDC 
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(Kriger, 2012). The legitimacy of ZANU-PF rule in Zimbabwe was also cast in doubt earlier, as 
various elections throughout the past decade came under criticism for vote rigging, as noted by 
many interviewees as well as by other scholars (Dorman, 2005) and amidst allegations that 
institutionalized corruption has been rampant (Bracking, 2005). Indeed, the crackdown against 
government-defined “illegality” in Marange’s diamond fields is just one instance among a long 
list of “crackdown operations” throughout Zimbabwe’s post-colonial history (Bratton and 
Masunungure, 2006), and the language of “restoring order” has long been central to the 
governments’ repressive measures against “informal” sector workers (Potts, 2006; Kamete, 
2012). However, given the perspective that is formally promoted by the KPCS, any local 
resistance against the ZANU-PF command structure using revenue from smuggled diamonds 
could be construed as a potential “conflict diamonds” risk.  
While “conflict diamond” discourses are often linked with ideas of “rebel violence”, as in 
the case of Sierra Leone’s conflict diamonds, interviews conducted with small-scale miners as 
well as government officials in Zimbabwe reinforced the point that the KP’s notion of “rebels” 
does not apply in Zimbabwe’s case. Artisanal miners interviewed in this study nevertheless 
often spoke of how they felt they were being treated as “rebellious” and “criminal” by just 
trying to survive by finding diamonds. Even assuming that such “economic rebelliousness” 
ought to be controlled by Zimbabwean police, the international policy community was divided 
on the question of how best to pressure the government to formalize diamond mining 
responsibly, and Marange’s diamond saga became an impetus for rethinking the economic and 
political interests that are served by resource formalization paradigms.20 
The globally contested spatial dimension of the discourse is significant both in how the 
discourse about Marange evolved in relation to the government’s legitimacy problems as well 
as how the discourse of smuggling began. Initially, in the early stages of the diamond rush, 
state control was said by KPCS inspectors to be necessary because of smuggling – and not just 
                                                 
20 Notably, during participant observation work in 2009, 2012 and 2013, the author attended several meetings 
with both artisanal miners and policymakers present in the same time, and in each case, artisanal miners were 
told by policymakers that no artisanal miner was granted a license for small-scale diamond mining.  
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smuggling of Zimbabwe’s diamonds but also smuggling of other countries’ diamonds through 
Zimbabwe. The World Diamond Council21 - representing the interest of the global diamond 
industry – expressed worry that smuggled DRC “blood diamonds” were being mixed with 
Zimbabwe’s diamonds, many of which lacked certification records, and smuggled abroad. The 
World Diamond Council chairman, Eli Izhakoff, alleged that diamonds from both Marange and 
River Ranch Mine (one of the two already-operating diamond mines in Zimbabwe) were being 
smuggled into South Africa. This was picked up by media coverage that suggested that old 
ZANU-PF connections with DRC diamond traders (from the DRC war days) were coming into 
play to pass off smuggled diamonds as legitimate (IRIN, 2007). This particular concern 
promoted a vision of diamond governance that saw any and all cross-border smuggling as 
problematic, in keeping with the rules of the KPCS (Smillie, 2010). Coming from the World 
Diamond Council, this discourse suggested that smuggling could taint the image of the 
industry. The discourse on conflict diamonds was thus intertwined not only with a discourse on 
appropriate governance – but indeed with the dominant discourse of macro-economic 
development that could benefit from “properly conducted” diamond mining that served the 
interests of global capitalism, not the interests of local artisanal miners. This analysis resonates 
with Welker’s analysis of corporate responsibility discourse in the mining sector in Indonesia 
(Welker, 2009) wherein political elites and corporate actors justified mining sector 
securitization measures according to what they framed as a moral need, namely the pursuit of 
development and modernization. 
Ultimately, some African governments, including South Africa and Angola, refused to 
vote Zimbabwe out of the KPCS, expressing political “solidarity”22 with President Robert 
Mugabe in some cases – and in most cases, expressing their opposition to the idea of expanding 
                                                 
21 The World Diamond Council, established in 2000, is an organisation that represents the interests of over 50 
diamond trading companies and diamond mining companies, introduced specifically “to address the 
challenges of conflict diamonds,” It is a “key participant in the development and implementation of the KPCS 
(http://www.worlddiamondcouncil.com/, accessed September 13, 2013). 
22 Gabriel Shumba, speaking on behalf of the Zimbabwe Blood Diamonds Campaign, characterizes the 
support of some African countries as “misguided solidarity to Robert Mugabe” (The Zimbabwean, 2011). 
Influential Kimberley Process members, including South Africa, supported allowing Zimbabwean diamond 
exports; China and India also publicly declared their support in 2011.  
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the definition of “conflict” beyond the KP’s “conflict diamond” definition. Some diamond 
companies – including De Beers – also lobbied to keep the diamond conflict certification 
definition the way it was. An interview with a De Beers spokesperson suggested that diamond 
companies were very resistant and opposed to changing the definition of conflict diamonds to 
include types of conflict beyond the existing definition.23 However, not all companies had the 
same interests. While Canadian diamond companies and Canadian government officials 
publicly denigrated Zimbabwe’s illicit diamonds and urged for their boycott (Davis, 2011), Ian 
Smillie, a prominent Canadian researcher who has worked with the NGO Partnership Africa 
Canada, suggested that Australian companies were more inclined to defend Zimbabwe’s 
diamond exports initially, since another diamond mining company in another part of Zimbabwe 
was partly owned by Australians.  In some cases, international companies and foreign 
governments changed their position. For instance, although Australian government 
representatives initially resisted supporting a ban on Zimbabwe’s diamond exports (leading to 
Ian Smillie’s critiques), they began to support the notion of a partial ban once it became evident 
that Murowa Diamond Mine (in South Central Zimbabwe), 78% owned by Rio Tinto, under 
Australian ownership, could be exempt from the sanctions, which could be directed purely at 
the Marange diamonds rather than all Zimbabwean diamonds.  
Some NGO spokespeople changed their position too, illustrated most powerfully when 
Ian Smillie resigned from his position in the KPCS in May of 2009, citing his frustration with 
the diamond certification system and specifically its lack of firmness, eventually criticizing 
how its “consensus decision-making process has turned it into a dozy talk shop – unable and 
unwilling to deal with noncompliance” (Smillie, 2013, p. 1020). As one news source put it: 
“The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme has this week been dealt the hardest blow to its 
reputation and standing since its inception, when Ian Smillie, the driving force behind 
Partnership Africa-Canada, the immensely influential conflict diamonds NGO, quietly 
announced his departure from participation in the KP” (Even-Zohar, 2009).  This change in 
                                                 
23 Interview with advisor on International Relations Strategy to De Beers Diamond Company, January 17, 
2009, Cambridge, United Kingdom. 
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position exemplified the eroding confidence in global certification as an effective conflict-
prevention tool. It also suggested that what ensued in Zimbabwe in the aftermath of a diamond 
discovery in 2006 was a dynamic assemblage of political frictions, where geopolitical tensions 
over Zimbabwe’s crisis of governance legitimacy and global definitional debates over “conflict 
diamonds” converged and produced, in that process of convergence, a shifting fragmentation in 
perspectives on how efforts to certify “conflict-free” diamonds should work.  
 
4. Conclusions 
To conclude, the multinational diamond industry’s certification discourses are often 
linked with ideas of rebel violence, providing a fashionable point of analytic focus in the 
international policymaking and academic communities. Multiple econometric and political 
studies have sought to measure how rebel conflict increases due to diamond extraction in 
Africa, often making the case for curbing illegal mining and promoting “sound practices” in the 
multinational mining industry (e.g. Olsson, 2006; Lujala et al., 2005; Collier, 2010). But who 
are the rebels in Zimbabwe’s case? Women and men interviewed in this study often spoke of 
how they felt they were being treated as “rebellious” and “criminal” by just trying to survive by 
finding minerals.  
The present study dovetails with the work of Jones (2010) in emphasizing that 
operating in the “parallel market” has been an act of survival for thousands of people in 
Zimbabwe due to extreme economic and political crises. Furthermore, it illustrated how the 
question of policing “illegitimate” diamond mining powerfully divided both the national and 
international policy communities in the wake of Marange’s diamond discovery, raising 
questions that go far beyond Zimbabwe’s borders. The study’s analysis suggested that multi-
national corporate power, “fair trade” commoditization, and technocratic development ideology 
inter-related with authoritarian state control tactics during a period of instability in ways that 
exacerbated the marginalization of poor communities.  
This study’s analytic approach to understand conflict in Marange also builds upon Le 
Billon’s concern about the risk of “essentialising and depoliticizing violence” (Le Billon, 2012, 
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p. 87) and the work of Nyota and Sibanda (2012), who draw attention to the displacement of 
villagers that occurred when large-scale mining companies were awarded contracts for this 
region’s diamond rights. Physical acts of human rights abuses by military soldiers in Marange 
were the most widely reported problem cited in international human rights NGO reports after 
the end of 2008, but this study has sought to re-conceptualise the Marange saga by re-
configuring analytic focus on the rights of artisanal miners and marginalized communities to 
pursue their livelihoods. Approaching rights and fair trade from this alternative perspective 
suggests that the depoliticisation of “illegality” is an inherent problem that obscures the 
dispossession of small producers. In examining patterns of land reform in Zimbabwe years 
prior to the diamond rush, Andreasson (2006) observed that “property rights necessarily 
generate violent, and oftentimes lethal, processes of dispossession… In this context of ongoing 
dispossession, further privatisation and commodification can only exacerbate contemporary 
problems of marginalisation and dispossession” (p. 3); the securitization of property rights in 
Marange provided an especially violent example of this. 
This analysis adds to growing skepticism among geographers when contemplating the 
power of a “conflict-free” brand to account for complex injustices in the mining sector and to 
critiques of “fair trade” movements for “fetishizing” while obfuscating capitalist commodity 
chains more broadly (Goodman, 2004; Schlosser, 2013, Schroeder, 2010). Klooster (2010) 
refers to the “fantasy” that neoliberal fair trade certification can promote “fair trade” while 
maintaining business as usual. The Marange case suggests that critiques of ethical branding 
instruments should take into account the diverse and dynamic political interests inherent in 
mining industry/civil society/government initiatives that strive for the certification of 
commodity chains. Attention to conflict-free diamonds, while of great use to corporate interests 
in protecting the image of a global commodity chain, provided no benefit to populations in 
Zimbabwe who were marginalized and oppressed in the process. Ultimately, the Marange saga 
represents not simply the most serious challenge yet to the diamond industry’s corporate 
branding instrument, but also calls into question the rhetorical focus points of those who have 
sought to critique it. 
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